The business press plays a significant role in distributing firm news to investors. We investigate the extent to which managers can influence their firm's level of coverage in newswires and national newspapers, compared with the effects of fixed firm characteristics and the news content itself. We consider three choices under managerial control: press release timing, press wire service, and ease of firm access. We find evidence that issuing press releases during the day instead of at night increases the probability of coverage, from 9% to 20% for newspapers and from 89% to 95% for newswires. Nonetheless, the largest determinants of coverage are factors like firm size and industry, which lie outside managerial control. We also examine how media incentives affect coverage choices. We find that newspapers are disproportionately likely to cover negative news, but newswires are not, suggesting that papers cover particular business events for reasons other than informativeness.
Introduction
A burgeoning literature on the business press has found that coverage by media publications has significant implications for both the trading and pricing of securities. Immediately following news coverage, firms with greater coverage have higher absolute returns and trading volume (Li, Ramesh, and Shen 2011) and lower spreads (Bushee et al. 2010) . Over the longer run, firms with greater media coverage have lower expected returns (Fang and Peress 2009) . Together, this evidence provides robust support that media coverage plays a significant role in affecting the desirability of a firm's security.
This amount of media coverage a firm receives is, however, not exogenous. Coverage of a particular story is affected by a variety of factors related to a firm's influence and the perceived significance of the news event. These factors influence the newsworthiness of story and hence reporters likelihood of covering the event for journalistic reasons. Given the significant consequences of greater or lesser media attention, managers have incentives to influence the amount of coverage their firm receives.
There is clear evidence that managers spend considerable time and resources seeking ways to influence coverage (Holstein 2008) . However, prior research has not examined the efficacy of managerial efforts to influence this coverage. Our analysis seeks to address this question by examining to what extent managers have control over the amount of press coverage their firm receives and by what means.
Although many factors that influence press coverage lie outside direct managerial control, managers still have a variety of options at their disposal which can potentially influence the amount of coverage their firm receives in the short run. We examine three choices: press release timing, press wire service choice, and ease of firm access, which managers have direct control over and can immediately adjust. We examine these discretionary choices in conjunction with other factors that influence media coverage to understand the extent to which managers can influence coverage of their news.
In order to investigate the amount of control managers have over their business press coverage, we divide factors that affect coverage into three distinct categories-factors that are specific to the firm, factors that are variable with the information disclosed by the firm, and factors that managers have the immediate ability to influence. Variables, like size and industry, are firm characteristics that cannot be changed by managers in the short run. Factors related to information in the release, like whether it is positive or negative, or also outside the immediate discretion of management. However, the third category of decisions, including press wire service choice and the timing of a release, are under direct managerial discretion. Our empirical analysis finds evidence that all three categories, to differing degrees, affect press coverage.
In terms of variables that are subject to managerial discretion from release to release, we find support that disclosing in the evening reduces the probability of newspaper coverage from 20% to 9%, and the probability of newswire coverage from 95% to 89%. Offering more firm contacts is associated with greater press coverage, but does not appear to causally affect coverage from release to release. We also do not find robust support, despite advertising claims to the contrary, that certain press wire services garner greater press coverage for firms using their service.
Since journalists at different press mediums face different objectives and restrictions, we examine two separate and distinct sources of media coverage-newswires and newspapers. Our results indicate that certain factors influence newswires and newspaper coverage differently and in ways consistent with the objectives and restrictions faced by journalists at each medium. In particular, we find evidence that more surprising news receives more coverage by wires and increases the likelihood and amount of coverage by newspapers. Our analysis also shows that very negative news is more likely to receive coverage by newspapers, but not newswires. Given wire journalists' expertise in covering financial news and their target audience of finance professionals, this suggests that newspapers do not cover more negative news because of its perceived economic value, but rather because of a bias towards coverage of sensational events.
Overall, our analysis suggests that the largest determinants of press coverage appear to be factors outside managerial control. The most significant effects on coverage are related to a firm's size and industry. These two factors alone explain up to 41% of the variation in press coverage. The effect of changing the timing of disclosures is considerably smaller, and efforts like switching press wire service do not appear to be effective at all. From a managerial perspective, there is little empirical evidence to support that expending significant time and effort on attempting to strategically make these choices is an effective or productive use of time.
This suggests that other mechanisms of trying to distribute news to investors, like direct news dissemination, may prove more effective than short run efforts to influence journalists through the limited number of means under managerial control. A growing array of tools, now allows mangers to reach investors directly. For example, Blankespoor et al. (2012) examine managers' use of Twitter to reach investors and reduce information asymmetries while avoiding journalistic barriers. Alternatively, managers could choose to focus on long-term efforts that require building relationships, which other research has shown to be effective in influencing coverage (e.g. utilizing an investor relations firm as in Solomon (2012) and Bushee and Miller (2012) ).
Investigating the extent by which managers can influence media coverage contributes to the academic literature in several ways. First, a growing literature finds that press coverage has significant economic implications. Coverage affects trading (Engelberg and Parsons (2010) , Bushee et al. (2010) ), spreads (Bushee et al. (2010) ), pricing (Chan (2003) , Fang and Peress (2009 ), Huberman and Regev (2001 ), Dyck and Zingales (2003 , Foster (1979) ), firm value (Gurun and Butler (2012) ), and mutual fund selection ). Without variation in what journalists cover, we would not observe these effects.
To actually see where these effects originate, it is important to understand what causes journalists to cover and report on specific news events and the extent to which managers can influence this coverage.
Therefore, by better understanding the institutions and environment which gives rise to this variation, we can better appreciate the implications of differential press coverage. In this way, this paper seeks to begin to answer the question posed in Berger (2011) which asked "when, why, and to what extent does the business press screen or filter firm-initiated disclosures" (211).
In the course of examining the effects of differential press coverage, prior work has examined several firm and information variables in their analysis.
1 Our analysis differs in an important regard by specifically seeking to address the question of how much control managers have on their media coverage.
Given the significant amount of time and managerial resources devoted to efforts to try and influence coverage, examining these later variables, in conjunction with firm and information variables, offers the most managerially relevant analysis on the determinants of coverage.
Our analysis also suggests that, while both analysts and the business press are information intermediaries, it would be erroneous to classify all information intermediaries into one homogenous group. In particular, like analysts, the business press disseminates economically relevant news that facilitates market transactions (e.g. Lang and Lundholm (1993) , Francis et al (1998) ). However, the press also plays an "entertainment role" by disproportionately covering certain news events (e.g. extreme negative news), which are not obviously linked to the significance of economic phenomena. This is in contrast to Green et al. (2012) which also find a negative news bias in a large news database, but they argue it is for competitive and informational reasons. Our results suggest that the press is not simply a benign intermediary that only seeks to enhance the functioning of markets. 2 This press bias, while outside the immediate control of management, influences the effects of greater or lesser coverage.
Coverage Choices by the Business Press

The Constituency of the Business Press
Beginning in the mid 19 th century, the business press grew out of the interest to "gather, [to] interpret, and to disseminate" information related to the performance of firms (Smith 1954) . A wide range of publications developed to satiate investors' desire for timely business news and information. These publications differed in frequency, style, depth, perspective, and audience.
Our analysis focuses on two types of publications that differ significantly in their distribution and coverage. National newspapers are published on a daily basis and delivered to homes, businesses, and newsstands. More recently, articles for these publications are being offered online. They contain business news as part of their overall coverage in both their general reporting of events (e.g. front section) and a separate business news section.
Newswires differ most significantly from newspapers in that they publish news exclusively in electronic format. Newswire coverage is available both through direct subscription with services like
Reuters and through publication partners like Yahoo! Finance. Business newswires are aimed at "financial professionals" (Dow Jones). As a result, consumers of newswires, on average, tend to be more market driven consumers of information than consumers of newspapers. The electronic distribution medium removes space constraints permitting more generous coverage of firms and news events.
Objectives of Journalists
The press, like other commercial information intermediaries, faces limitations on how much news its journalists can both cover and publish. Both newswires and newspapers are constrained on the number of journalists that are able to research and write articles. In addition, print newspapers, unlike newswires, also have limitations on the amount of space available for articles.
Given bounds on the amount that publications can cover and publish, editors are forced to make choices about which firms and events to cover. When faced with the publication's objective to maximize circulation, editors will select items that will appeal to the readership (Hamilton 2004) . Consequently, journalistic choices about what firm news to cover will be motivated by how broadly the story will appeal to the publication's audience.
Along with the desire to write articles with maximum appeal is the need to produce articles in a timely manner. While a particular news event may have significant appeal from a journalistic standpoint, the circumstance provided by another event may offer a more convenient opportunity to produce an article in the allotted time. For example, journalists at the New York Times are asked to submit their copy for the print version of the paper by 6pm. Significantly beyond this time, or unless an exception is made, stories are unlikely to make the following day's publication since the paper needs to be sent out for printing and delivery. Consequently, events occurring in the evening near the deadline are more difficult for journalists to cover.
Journalists desire to produce stories with wide appeal while being under specific institutional conditions that restrict the amount of firm news they can cover and ultimately publish. In doing so, not all firms or disclosures by firms are covered in the press. Choices about which articles to produce are the result of an equilibrium between the objective of publications (e.g. maximize circulation) and the limitations of the news production process (e.g. time and number of journalists).
Influencing Coverage
For each of the factors, we describe how the variable can influence journalists' activities and its hypothesized effect on press coverage.
Firm Size
Larger firms will have a shareholder base with more shareholders, more invested shareholders, and/or more potential investors. Larger firms are also likely to have more connections with other firms and economic activities of interest to non-shareholders. In doing so, larger firms have a connection or relationship with a greater number of readers. Editors who seek to publish news that is of interest to the greatest number of readers may thus endeavor to publish news on larger firms. Thus, we expect larger firms to have significantly more newswire and newspaper coverage.
Level of Unexpectedness
In their goal to publish news that engages and interests readers, financial journalists will seek to publish stories on events deemed more newsworthy. Among the basic tenets of journalism is that news which is less expected and of greater surprise is more newsworthy (Pape and Featherston 2005) . Editors seek to engage as many readers as possible in their publications' stories and will choose more newsworthy items to accomplish this. Following this tenet, we hypothesize that firm news that is more unexpected has a greater likelihood of being covered.
Industry
Within the nexus of business, industries vary in their scope and influence. Industries playing a more interconnected role to a greater number of firms will attract additional interest and attention. For example, the availability and pricing of oil affects a wide range of businesses (e.g. aviation, fabricated products). Consequently, the performance of firms in the petroleum industry has significant implications for firms and industries outside the petroleum business. At the same time, editors of publications may also want to use their discretion to tilt coverage towards certain industries that are seen as being of greater interest to their desired readership base. For example, in the late 1990's the Wall Street Journal began publishing more stories about retail firms under the belief that this would help attract more female readers to the publication. 3 Consequently, we anticipate that some industries with a consumer focus will garner greater coverage.
Negativity
The press is widely regarded as producers of entertainment as well as news (Jensen 1979) . Events that are viewed as sensational can attract readers interested in the spectacular. Although events can be sensationally positive or negative, there is a widely held perception that the press is more likely to cover negative news and events (Holstein 2008) . Extreme negative news about firms also has the opportunity to be of greater interest and economic value to readers. For example, firms disclosing news that suggests future insolvency would be of interest to debt holders, creditors, and other firms relying on the continued operation of the firm (e.g. as part of the manufacturing supply chain). Thus, we investigate whether negative events are more likely to receive press coverage.
Timing of Release
Journalists face deadlines for the submission and publication of articles. At newspapers facing deadlines to accommodate printing, journalists are subject to "hard-stop" times at which point they are required to submit stories. Events occurring soon before the deadline are more difficult to cover. In addition, even if a story can be completed before the deadline, the reporter's obligation or the desired space may have already been filled. For these reasons, we hypothesize that newspapers are less likely to cover disclosures released later in the day.
Newswire journalists do not face the same publication deadlines. Although they are motivated by speed of publication (Tambini 2010) , whether an event occurs at 3pm or 3am does not affect whether it 3 During the first decade of the 21 st century, The Wall Street Journal continued this practice (Seelye 2007) .
can be physically published as in the case of newspapers. However, outside of regular business hours staffing is reduced and/or outsourced. Moreover, the demand for 'updated' newswire pieces about a disclosure is reduced. Consequently, fewer wire articles are likely to be produced when a release is made later in the day.
Beyond journalists' limitations in covering news later in the day, managers could also choose to support evening releases differently. Specifically, given that evening releases occur after hours, the level of support offered to these releases could diminish. If so and to the extent that this unobservable support is significant at gaining coverage, we would also expect this to reduce the likelihood of coverage of releases made later in the day.
Press Wire Service
Press wire services act as intermediaries between firms and the media. When a firm seeks to distribute a press release, it sends the release to a press wire service, which then redistributes the release to media partners. There are four major press wire services: PR Newswire, Business Wire, Market Wire, and GlobeNewswire. Most publicly traded firms in the United States rely on the two leading press wire services-PR Newswire and Business Wire (a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway). Competition for clients among the press wire services focuses heavily on differential service quality (e.g. accessibility of personalized customer assistance).
PR Newswire also advertises its ability to garner more press coverage for their clients. This argument is supplemented with a study on its web site to substantiate this view. 4 Consequently, clients may be inclined to use PR Newswire over other press wire services because of its ability to garner greater press coverage. To investigate potential differences in coverage due to a firm's choices in press wire service, we investigate whether any press wire service helps garner more coverage than others.
Ease of Company Access
The pressure journalists face to produce articles in a timely manner increases their reliance on sources that are convenient to access (Tambini 2010 Firms offering more than one contact create greater ease for journalists to follow up with a company spoke-person; this may increase the likelihood that a journalist will write about the firm. We expect this relationship to differ for newswires and print publications. Wire services strive to provide information rapidly and thus the choice of initially covering a press release may be less sensitive to the ease of following up with the firm. However, wire journalists sometimes write 'update articles' (i.e.
follow-up wire article about the firm's release), and the ease of contacting the firm may have a greater effect on their tendency to write such updates. Journalists at print publications are typically expected to write in greater depth and investigate matters more deeply suggesting they would have a greater interest in contacting the company than a newswire journalist.
Data
Description of Sources and Variable Measurement
We acquire data from numerous sources to examine the factors influencing press coverage. Our sample period begins in January 2002, ends in December 2006, and focuses on earnings news for US publicly listed companies as in Solomon 2012. 5 Our choice to focus on earnings releases is twofold. First, earnings announcements offer a sample of routine news events with measurable information content that can be controlled for empirically. This reduces the concern that we will be measuring omitted variables related to heterogeneity in the underlying events being disclosed. Second, focusing on earnings releases connect helps connect this analysis more closely to much of the previous and ongoing work on the effects of the business press. We utilize market capitalization data from CRSP and analyst coverage and earnings data from the For each search, we utilize a number of combinations of the firm name to conduct the search. We also supplement each search using the Factiva company code, which is a unique code assigned to each firm by Dow Jones. For newspaper searches, Factiva company keys tend to be a less reliable way of searching for company cites than using the company name due to coding errors on Factiva. Our analysis only includes articles with some textual content (i.e. exclude articles which are only a table). This reduces the possible confounding of journalistic coverage with automated computerized tabulation. From the articles on Factiva, we find the press wire service from the source field. To measure ease of access we count the number of phone numbers provided in the contact field of the release in Factiva.
For all factors, we investigate how the variables affect four different measures of press coveragetwo measures of newswire coverage and two measures of newspaper coverage. The measures are designed to be closely linked to the literature on the effects of coverage (e.g. Fang and Peress (2009) and Bushee et al (2010) utilize measures of the presence and count of articles covering a firm). Each press coverage variable is measured over a day-long period (for newswires it is the same day as the release and papers the following day). For robustness, we also examine additional specifications extending the measurement window. An examination of articles suggests that the shorter one-day window appears to most accurately capture articles given our focus on earnings releases. This is consistent with the relatively short life cycle of most news events (Pape and Featherstone 2005) . Table I presents descriptive statistics for the firm and press coverage variables. Panel A provides data on the frequency of particular release choices. For timing, 39% of the releases are in the evening. As suggested by industry data, the vast majority of the firms in our sample utilize either PR Newswire or Business Wire. PR Newswire has a larger share with 54% of the sample utilizing its service as compared with 45% with Business Wire. Multiple contacts are offered on 44% of the releases. Table I , Panel B provides statistics on the amount of press coverage received by each release.
Descriptive Statistics
Most releases receive some wire coverage and conditional on receiving some coverage, the average release receives coverage by nearly 4 newswires. Coverage by newspapers is somewhat lower as expected given their more limited space. 18% of releases receive some newspaper coverage and each release receives .26 newspaper articles of coverage on average.
Analysis of Coverage
Firm Specific Variables that Can Affect Coverage
Table II examines two first specific factors, size and industry, that are hypothesized to affect coverage. Examining these variables seek to reexamine prior findings in the context of our data as well as calibrate our model so that we can examine the incremental effect of managerial controlled variables on coverage. However, our work also differs in that we examine the differential effects of coverage on newswires and newspapers.
Regressions (1)- (4) show that larger firms are significantly more likely to receive some wire coverage. One advantage of the quintile variable in regressions (2) and (4) is that it permits nonlinearities and allows a more careful inspection of the effects of size on coverage. Being in the fifth (i.e. largest) size quintile increases the probability of some wire coverage by 25% (i.e. the likelihood of coverage rises from 74% to 99%). 6 Several industries are more likely to receive coverage. At the 10% level of statistical significance, defense, consumer goods, transportation, and hospitality industries are more likely to receive some wire coverage. These industries are consumables that appeal to news readers on an individual level.
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We find a similarly pronounced effect of size and industry on newspaper coverage in regressions (5)- (8). Being in the fifth (i.e. largest) size significantly increases the probability of some paper coverage by 48% (i.e. the likelihood of coverage rises from 6% to 54%). Firms in the food, tobacco, precious metals, and real estate industries are more likely to have articles written about them at the 10% level of statistical significance.
We find that market capitalization and industry explain between 36% and 41% of the variation in the number of newswire articles, and between 21% and 26% of the variation in the number of newspaper articles. Our findings that the press is more likely to cover some industries is in contrast to Fang and Peress (2009) . One explanation is their reliance on coarser one and two digit SIC codes rather than Fama
French industry portfolios, but this difference is important since it suggests there are certain types of firms which receive disproportionate coverage by the media.
News Specific Variables that Can Affect Coverage
In tables III and IV, we examine two factors, related to the news itself being disclosed, that are hypothesized to affect coverage. (1) suggests that the absolute level of earnings surprise does not have a large impact on the probability of receiving wire coverage. When the surprise is divided into quintiles, two surprise quintiles are statistically 6 We interpret the marginal effects of all other variables for our probit estimates at their average value. 7 We also examined longer time windows for measurement of the dependent variables. The statistical and economic significance between the specifications is largely similar. For example, using a two-day coverage window, the coefficient on firm size for the amount of paper coverage is .13 (as compared with .09 for a one-day window). The standard error is .008 (as compared with .006 for a one day window).
News Unexpectedness
significant. However, the magnitude is limited to approximately 2%. Consequently, surprise does not appear to particularly influence whether any wires cover the release. In contrast, more surprising news significantly affects the amount of wire coverage in an economically and statistically significant way. The most surprising news in the fifth quintile receives nearly 13% more wire articles. For newspapers, more surprising news has a higher probability of receiving some coverage, and also a greater amount of coverage. This effect increases in the surprise of the news as seen in the quintile regressions (6) and (8).
The fact that unexpectedness increases the quantity of newswire articles, but has less effect on the probability of any newswire article may seem to be paradoxical. However, this pattern can be understood by distinguishing between initial coverage (a newswire deciding to write about a press release they might have otherwise ignored) and follow-up coverage (a newswire deciding to write a subsequent article exploring in detail a previous story that they wrote about).
Our results are consistent with unexpected news primarily affecting the likelihood of follow-up articles for releases that the newswire had already decided to cover, but having a smaller impact on the decision to cover the release in the first place. This is consistent with the aims of newswires to cover stories in a very timely manner (i.e. often within minutes). Releasing a written summary within this time frame does not allow long for the journalist to decide whether to cover the story or not. As a result, this decision appears more sensitive to fixed factors of the firm examined above, where the journalist has decided in advance to cover stories by a given firm. Unexpectedness does seem to play a role when the journalist decides to revisit the story with a follow-up article, with surprising news being more likely to generate subsequent analysis. For newspaper journalists, however, our results are consistent with having a longer time frame in which to decide whether to write about a story. In doing so, paper journalists are able to be more sensitive to the unexpectedness of the news in deciding whether the story warrants coverage.
Negative News
In Table IV , we investigate the relationship between reporting bad news on the likelihood and amount of press coverage. The regressions resemble those in Table IV , but we also include a dummy variable that equals one for negative surprises, and zero otherwise. We find evidence for newspapers, but not for newswires, that extreme negative news is more likely to be covered and with a greater amount of coverage. Specifically, firms with a negative surprise in the fifth (i.e. greatest negative surprise) quintile are 14% more likely to receive coverage by a paper (i.e. the likelihood of coverage rises from 13% to 28%).
The coverage of extreme negative news by papers in Table IV offers two possible interpretations.
Papers, unlike newswires, are sold to a broad readership base. To the extent that extreme negative news is more sensational and appeals to a non-financial reader base, this divergence in coverage between wires and papers is consistent with media sensationalism. An alternative explanation is that papers are not seeking to cover more sensational news in covering very negative events, but rather there is more newsworthy economic information for readers contained in these events. For example, firms that experience significantly negative news may be more likely to go into default. This information would be of interest to both bond holders and creditors. However, this information based view seems less plausible given that newswire services do not also increase the likelihood of covering these events. This explanation would require that wire services do not understand the information content of these events despite being focused on providing news to financial professionals. Given this, the sensationalism theory provides a more compelling explanation. 
Variables that Can Affect Coverage Under Managerial Control
In tables V through VII, we examine three factors, related, the timing of the release, the ease of firm contact, and the choice of press wire service, that are hypothesized to affect coverage.
Timing of Release
Tables V examines whether the timing of releases influences the amount of press coverage. Our sample size for our analysis of release timing is smaller than in prior analyses due to the reliance of timings data from Doyle and Magilke (2009) 14% less likely to be covered by a paper. In both cases, these differences are statistically significant.
One explanation for these differences in coverage is that the firms releasing in the evening have differences in size and the level of news unexpectedness. In Table V , Panel B, we control for these factors in OLS regressions and continue to find that disclosing in the evening is associated with lower coverage.
In particular, we find that firms disclosing in the evening reduces the likelihood of wire coverage by 5%
and the amount of wire coverage by 15%. In addition, the likelihood of paper coverage reduces by 11%
(i.e. the probability of coverage declines from 20% to 9%).
The fact that news released in the evening has a significant impact on the probability of newswire coverage is consistent with newswires having fewer journalists present in the evening. The concern that evening news is simply different in content in ways that are not being measured is lessened by the fact that other forms of different news (i.e. more unexpected, more negative) in previous cases did not impact the probability of wire coverage.
In terms of the economic size of evening coverage, the timing of the release in Table V offers some additional explanatory power about what the press chooses to cover. As one indication, the Rsquared of the likelihood of wire coverage regression increases from .18 to .21 after including the evening release indicator. On the other hand, this is significantly less than the combined impact of firm size and industry effects. In addition, the magnitude of the effects is less -moving from the 1 st to the 5 th quintile of size increases the probability of newspaper coverage by 53%, but switching to evening disclosures reduces the probability of newspaper coverage by 11%.
Firm Contacts
Table VI examines the relationship between the number of firm contacts and coverage. Panel A offers a univariate comparison of press coverage between releases with one contact and multiple contacts.
We find that releases with multiple contacts have statistically more wire and newspaper coverage with the difference in newspaper coverage being more economically significant at nearly 7%.
To control for variation across firms and releases with different numbers of contacts, we examine levels regressions in Panel B. Having multiple contacts is associated with more wire coverage and a greater likelihood of paper coverage. The magnitude of the effects in both cases is 6% and 3% respectively. For newswires, having multiple contacts appears to have a more consistent effect on the total amount of coverage than on the probability of coverage. This is again consistent with multiple contacts having a larger effect on the probability of follow-up articles (after the initial coverage decision has been made), rather than the initial coverage of the article. For newspapers, the effect of multiple contacts is significant at the 1% level for both the probability of coverage and the amount of coverage.
Press Wire Service
Finally, Table VII examines a firm's choice of press wire service. As the vast majority of firms utilize PR Newswire or Business Wire (Table I , Panel A), we create three press wire service indicator variables-PR Newswire, Business Wire, and other (i.e. Marketwire and GlobeNewswire). Panel A provides a univariate comparison of the press coverage utilizing the different press wire services. For both, newswires and newspapers we find statistically significant evidence supporting PR Newswire's claim that firms utilizing their service garner more coverage. However, the difference in coverage between PR Newswire and Business Wire is approximately 1% in both cases and not statistically significant, which suggests that this difference is of limited economic value.
In Table VII , Panel B, we investigate the relationship between press wire choice and coverage through probit and OLS regressions. Once we control for firm size, industry, and news significance, we no longer find any difference in coverage between the different press wire services.
The lack of any relationship between the press wire service choice and the amount of press coverage contradicts claims by PR Newswire. Our analysis suggests that while PR Newswire claims are only accurate at the univariate level. PR Newswire's marketing claim may be misleading to clients since a more careful analysis which controls for differences in clients and releases across the different press wires services no longer supports their assertion.
Strategic Behavior and Omitted Characteristics
One potential concern raised by the results in Section 4 is whether the results are causal in nature.
The observed variation of those factors under managerial control -timing of disclosures, ease of access, and the choice of press wire service-may be related strategic firm behavior. For example, managers could choose to release news at night when they deliberately desire the news to receive less coverage. Although we are able to measure most of the information content by focusing on earnings announcements, there may be other actions that managers take that could be simultaneously correlated with our variable of interest. In addition, even if managers are not acting strategically, there remains the question of what economic factors are driving the variation in choice of disclosure times. They may be fixed characteristics of the firm, or they may be driven by other, potentially non-strategic, choices.
We attempt to address both of these concerns. For the question of strategic behavior, we have some ability to directly examine the issue. Seeking to suppress coverage of negative earnings news would be the most likely strategic disclosure choice. The reduced media coverage could lead investors to react less to the negative news, thus increasing the share price in the short run. If bad news is a significant motivation for strategic attempts to reduce coverage, we can examine whether the variables under managerial control vary according to the sign of the news.
The correlation between bad news and evening release is 0.0035, and statistically insignificant, which suggests that there is little evidence of managers strategically changing announcement practices according to the sign of the earnings announcement. This evidence is consistent with Doyle and Magilke (2009) , who similarly find no relationship between evening announcements and negative news. The correlation between bad news and having multiple contacts is -0.0013, and also statistically insignificant.
Similarly, there is no statistically significant correlation between bad news and the choice of the press wire circuit. This should reduce the concern that the results in Tables V, VI , and VII are driven by strategic behavior.
The other question is whether the variation in managerial actions may be driven by omitted firm characteristics. This would be a particular concern if the variation was only between firms -in other words, some firms disclose only in the evening, and some firms disclose only in the daytime. In this case, the question arises whether evening disclosures are proxying for some unmeasured characteristic of the firm. Although we attempt to control directly for the most important factors affecting coverage, it is conceivable that other correlated variables may significantly affect coverage.
We attempt to address this concern in two ways. The first is to examine whether firms with variation in timing appear different to firms with constant timing along other measures of disclosure practices. We examine the likelihood of firm management issuing a forecast about earnings, another disclosure choice faced by the firm, using the First Call database of historical management forecasts. We find that firms that always release earnings during the day have a 58.4% chance of issuing a management forecast, firms that always release earnings during the evening have a 59.4% chance of issuing a management forecast, and firms that switch at some point between evening and daytime have a 59.3%
chance of issuing a management forecast. In other words, we find that variable and fixed choice firms nonetheless appear similar along other measures of disclosure choice. This should lessen the concern that we are simply picking up omitted variables related to disclosure.
In addition, we also employ an econometric solution to address the question of omitted characteristics. The first way we do this is to include firm fixed effects. This has the effect of controlling for any omitted firm characteristics that remain constant over the sample. The identification in such a case is coming only from firms that switch between (for instance) daytime and evening announcements. We examine this in Table VIII . The regressions are similar to those in Table V and Table VI, with Table VIII Panel A corresponding to the timing of news regressions and Panel B corresponding to the number of contacts regressions. For regressions that use wire and paper as dependent variables, we use fixed effect logit regressions, and for those using quantities we use OLS regressions with firm fixed effects.
Since the fixed effects regressions rely on variation within a firm, it is important to understand how much within-firm variation there actually is for timing and contact detail. In the data, 34.4% of the firms in our sample exhibit some variation in the timing of their disclosure (i.e. they sometimes release earnings in the evening and sometimes release during the day). For contact details, 63.5% of firms have some variation over time in the number of contacts that they list. In addition, in 7.2% of the releases the number of phone numbers increases and in 7.3% of the releases the number of phone numbers goes down from one release to the next (for the same firm). This suggests that there are reasonable levels of withinfirm variation (without which the tests would lack any power), but also a large number of firms that exhibit only a single choice of timing.
Table VII, Panel A shows that releasing in the evening reduces coverage in both newspapers and newswires, even after controlling for firm fixed effects. As noted in Wooldridge (2003), we can multiply logit coefficients by .625 to compare them to probit estimates in Table V . In doing so, we find that the magnitude of the coefficient in (1) (with the dependent variable being the dummy variable wire) is somewhat smaller than in Table V . For the probability of newspaper coverage, the magnitude of an evening release is larger with the addition of fixed effects in column (3) (which uses the dummy variable
paper. In terms of the total amount of coverage, in regressions (2) and (4), we continue to find that releasing in the evening reduces the amount of newswire and newspaper coverage conditional on receiving some coverage. Specifically, evening releases receive 12% and 6% less wire and newspaper coverage respectively.
Panel B examines whether the effects of having multiple contacts persist after controlling for firm fixed effects. In this case, the evidence is weaker. In column (1), multiple contacts are associated with a higher probability of being covered in newswires, but this effect is not apparent when examining the total amount of newswire coverage. For newspapers, having multiple contacts does not show a statistically significant effect on coverage once firm fixed effects are added. As a result, having multiple contacts on press releases has an association with greater coverage, but this relationship seems to be linked to fixed firm characteristics and may not be a direct effect of the multiple contacts.
For the case of evening releases, which seem to show an effect in Table VIII , we also examine whether the effect of evening releases on coverage is evident when using change regressions. The dependent variable is the change in wire or newspaper coverage between the current earnings release and the release before the switch. The dependent variable in the change in wire and paper regressions take on a value of -1 if it is no longer covered, 0 if coverage is the same, and 1 if the release is now covered. The number of wires and papers regressions indicate the difference in the amount of coverage between the releases. The independent variables of interest are two indicator variables showing whether a firm switched its release to the evening (from a prior release in the morning) or switched its release to the morning (from a prior release in the evening). Table IX presents the results of the change regressions. We find that changing the time affects whether the firm will receive some wire coverage and the amount of wire coverage. In particular, firms switching to the evening receive nearly one less article. Similarly, for papers, we find evidence that switching affects the likelihood and amount of coverage. A firm switching to a morning release improves the likelihood of paper coverage by approximately 6%.
These results provide fairly robust evidence that the timing of press releases can impact coverage and that this is unlikely to be driven by selection effects or firm characteristics. The impact of evening coverage occurs when examining firms that change their disclosure policies and when adding in firm fixed effects to control for omitted fixed firm characteristics. In terms of the possibility of omitted timevarying variables, particularly those relating to strategic disclosure, we are able to exclude the most obvious motivations for strategic timing, namely good versus bad news. Overall, our results are consistent with disclosing during the evening having a causal impact on reducing coverage.
Conclusion
As the economics of the media business continue to change, we anticipate that managers' ability to influence the amount of coverage their firm receives will also evolve. On the wire side, newswire services are increasingly using research desks located around the world. This permits greater staffing at all times of the day. Moreover, outsourcing work to lower cost locations permits services to grow their staff and increase the amount of coverage. Following in the steps of newswires, print publications are increasingly distributing information electronically too. Thus, the differences between newswires and "print" publications are shrinking.
Our study offers several areas for potential future research. First, our analysis focuses on earnings releases, but firms issue many other types of releases. It would be worthwhile to understand whether the same forces influence coverage of other releases in the same predicable way. One significant hurdle in exploring other types of releases is controlling for the heterogeneity in the disclosures. Second, the emergence of alternative forms of coverage, like blogs, continues to gain greater credence as an alternative form of journalism to mainstream newswires and newspapers. Investigating how these new mediums differ from the traditional press may offer timely insights into the influence of the press in the financial markets. This table examines how press coverage of earnings press releases is affected by firm size and industry. For dependent variables, wire is a binary (0/1) of whether the release is covered by Dow Jones or Reuters. Paper is a binary (0/1) of whether the release is covered by either the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, New York Times, or Washington Post. The wire and paper models are probit regressions and the lnum_wires and lnum_papers are OLS regressions. lmcap is the log of the firm's market capitalization, and size quintile are dummy variables for whether the firm was in that quintile of market capitalization (with 5 being the largest firms, and 1 being the omitted category). Industry controls are 48 dummy variables for industries as determined by their SIC code, with the classifications being those of Fama and French (1997) . Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered two-way, by day and firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) Fama and French (1997) . Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered two-ways, by day and firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Fama and French (1997) . Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered two-ways, by day and firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table) , but with the inclusion of firm fixed effects. For independent variables, evening is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm discloses after market hours. multiple contacts is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm provides more than one contact phone number in the release. The wire and paper models are logit regressions and the lnum_wires and lnum_papers are OLS regressions. All regressions include industry controls that are designated by 48 dummy variables for industries as determined by their SIC code, with the classifications being those of Fama and French (1997) . Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered two-ways, by day and firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table examines how press coverage of earnings press releases is affected by the timing of the release under a change regression specification. For dependent variables, ∆wire describes whether the release is covered by Dow Jones or Reuters in the current earnings release compared with the prior release and takes on a value of -1 (no longer covered),0 (same coverage), or 1(now covered). ∆Paper describes whether the release is covered by either the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, New York Times, or Washington Post in the current earnings release compared with the prior release and takes on a value of -1,0, or 1. ∆num_wires and ∆num_papers indicate the difference in the amount of coverage between the releases. All regressions are OLS regressions clustered two-ways, by day and firm. Switch evening and switch morning are indicator variables equal to one if the firm changes to evening or morning respectively in the current earnings release. All regressions include industry controls that are designated by 48 dummy variables for industries as determined by their SIC code, with the classifications being those of Fama and French (1997) . *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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